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Abstract
Italian male wage inequality has increased at a relatively fast pace from the mid-
1980s until the early 2000s, while it has followed a flat trend since then. We analyse
this trend focusing on the period of most rapid growth in pay dispersion. By ac-
counting for worker and firm fixed effects, it is shown that workers’ heterogeneity
has been a major determinant of increased wage inequalities, while variability in
firm wage policies has declined over time. We also show that the growth in pay
dispersion has entirely occurred between livelli di inquadramento, i.e. job titles de-
fined by national industry-wide collective bargaining institutions, for which specific
minimum wages apply. We conclude that the underlying market forces determining
wage inequality have been largely channelled into the tight tracks set by the cen-
tralized system of industrial relations.
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1 Introduction
Wage inequalities have risen in most western countries during the last decades of the
past century. Several theories link this growth in the dispersion of the pay structure to
market forces. Katz and Murphy [1992] are among the first to attribute the growth in
US wage inequality to the demand and supply of workers’ skills. Similarly, Acemoglu and
Autor [2011] show that several innovations occurred in the production process may have
disrupted routine-based occupations over time, leading to a more polarized structure of
the workforce. Even if theories linking wage dispersion to market forces highlight relevant
mechanisms and have several merits, they do not always accurately predict the substan-
tial heterogeneity in the wage inequality trends observed not only between Europe and
Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. Blau and Kahn [1996] and Koeniger et al. [2007]), but also
within Continental Europe (e.g. Hipólito [2010]). Given that many of these economies
share fairly similar characteristics in terms of trade openness, educational attainments and
production technologies, such evidences suggest that labour market institutions could be
as important as supply and demand factors in shaping pay differentials and that their
influence on the wage structure should be carefully considered. On this respect, several
contributions indicate that declining minimum wages and union strength (e.g. Di Nardo
et al. [1996]), or changes in social norms (e.g Piketty and Saez [2003]) could be the main
drivers of the observed secular rise in wage differentials.
A more recent literature, based on matched worker-firm databases, has suggested that a
large part of the increase in wage inequality is between - rather than within - firms (see,
the evidence in Barth et al. [2016] for the US, and in Faggio et al. [2010] for the UK). One
important factor beyond the rise of the between-firm component appears to be related to
raising heterogeneity in the wage policies of observationally similar firms. In particular,
Card et al. [2013] show that firm-specific components of the wage variance explain up to
one fourth of the inequality growth occurred in West Germany between the late-1980s
and the beginning of the new century.
In studying the dynamics of between-plants wage dispersion, several authors have focused
on market-driven explanatory mechanisms, such as investments in computer technology
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(e.g. Dunne et al. [2004]), dispersion in productivity (e.g. Faggio et al. [2010] and Barth
et al. [2016]) and international trade (e.g. Helpman et al. [2017]). Others have instead
attributed the rise in the dispersion of firms’ wage premiums to the changes that have
occurred in wage setting institutions. In interpreting their results, Card et al. [2013] ar-
gue that changes occurred in the wage bargaining system since the early 1990s, namely
the possibility for German firms of opting-out from national contractual agreements, may
have driven up between-plants wage differentials. Dustmann et al. [2014] argue that this
decentralization in the wage setting process has allowed to cut unit labour costs and to
improve international competitiveness, fostering the German economic growth observed
in the last decade.
Our paper aims at showing the relevance of collective bargaining in driving the develop-
ments of wage inequality in another large manufacturing and export-oriented EU economy:
Italy. We also aim at drawing comparative lessons with (West) Germany, a country simi-
lar to Italy in many respects. Despite both countries have been exposed to similar forces
related to globalization and technological change, we show that developments in wage
inequality have been different in important respects (e.g., the role of firm wage policies).
We then argue that the specificities of Italian institutions have much to bear on these
results.
To draw our comparative analysis, we apply the methodology of Card et al. [2013] and
rely on similar matched employer-employee data. The main dataset used covers the en-
tire population of private-sector workers and firms in a major region of the country:
Veneto. To our aims, this sample has a number of advantages. First, Veneto is a rel-
atively self-contained labour market, emblematic of a manufacturing-oriented economy,
highly exposed to international competition and technological change. As such, its trends
in inequalities are less affected by regional differences in economic performance, sectoral
composition and internal migration, differences that can be particularly large between the
north and south of the country. On the other hand, the features and dispositions of the
Italian system of industrial relations are uniform across regions. Second, the Veneto data
provide us with the longest currently available dataset to document the long run evolu-
3
tion in wage inequality. Finally, we show that the main trends in wage inequality and
regression decomposition exercises, when computed on the smaller, more homogeneous
and manageable Veneto dataset, are very similar to results derived from a much larger
(but shorter and heterogeneous) dataset covering the entire Italian country.
We first document the episodic nature of the increase in Italian wage inequality. Inequal-
ity in Veneto (and in Italy) reduced in the 1970s, increased from the early 1980s until
the early 2000s, and stayed relatively constant until the present days. Focusing on the
male sample and on the period of most rapid growth in pay dispersion, we then study the
evolution of the following components of inequalities: time-varying characteristics of the
workforce, time-constant individual characteristics, firm-specific wage premiums, along
with the contribution arising from the correlation between them. We finally introduce
a variance decomposition technique designed to measure the influence of wage setting
institutions on the pay structure. In particular, we test whether the growth of different
components of wage inequality have occurred mostly within or between the fine job title
categories defined and protected by the country’s collective bargaining institutions. Our
data provides reliable information on these job-titles at the worker level, but only until
2004. This is, however, not a major limitation of the analysis, as the job-title data cover
precisely the only period in which Italian wage inequality was increasing.1
Studying the period from the 1980s until the early 2000s, which is characterized by a sim-
ilar growth in pay dispersion between Italy and Germany, we show that, differently from
the results documented by Card et al. [2013], there has been no growth in firms’ wage
premiums dispersion in the Italian case. Thus, our evidence suggests that Italian highly
centralized sector-wide wage setting mechanisms have not undergone the same renewal
processes characterizing the German labour market during the 1990s, and that conse-
quently Italian firms have been unable to opt-out, or diverge in any other significant way,
from the wage dynamics settled within the relevant industry-wide collective agreements.
A large proportion of the growth of Italian pay dispersion is due to raising heterogeneity
in the portable component of a worker’s pay. This is the part of the wage attributable
to individual-specific characteristics equally rewarded across employers. In principle, a
4
growing contribution of workers’ heterogeneity to the total wage variance may simply
reflect the underlying dynamics of supply and demand factors. However, we show that in
practice this component of inequality is closely linked to the wage pay scales bargained at
the industry level by the main union confederations and employers’ associations. Hence,
we interpret the finding of rising workers’ heterogeneity as yet another outcome induced
by the Italian system of industrial relations, which seems to impose significant constraints
on wage dynamics.
To substantiate our claim, we divide the variance of (log) wages and of workers’ portable
pay components into a within and a between job titles part. These job titles (called livelli
di inquadramento in Italian) are occupations, defined by the relevant sectoral collective
agreements, for which a specific minimum wage applies regardless of a worker’s union
membership. We find that the growth in the between-variance component virtually ex-
plains the entire inequality trend observed in the data, an evidence that, partly owing to
data limitations in past research on Italian wage inequality, has never been so extensively
documented before.
Our analysis also shows that another important component of the growth in wage inequal-
ity has been more positive sorting between firms’ pay premiums and the human capital
of the workforce. While part of this growth may simply be an indirect consequence of
increased dispersion in workers’ portable wage components, it is also tempting to asso-
ciate the improved assortative matching to the general labour market modernization and
deregulations experienced by Italy since the mid-1980s.
2 Institutional Context
During the entire period considered in this study, and largely still today, Italy has been
characterized by a wage setting mechanism fairly centralized at the sector-wide national
level. Collective contracts are de-facto binding for all employers and all workers, irre-
spective of union membership. Such agreements are signed (typically every two years)
by the major trade unions and employers’ associations at the industry-wide level. It is
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important to notice that there are no opting-out clauses in the Italian system. That is
to say, firms cannot decide to resort to firm-level contractual agreements derogating to
the wage standards settled at the sectoral level. Regional- or firm-level agreements can
only distribute top-up wage components, typically related to indicators of profitability or
productivity.
Each industry-wide collective contract regulates specific job titles (livelli di inquadra-
mento) and the contractual minimum wages that is to apply for each of them. Such livelli
di inquadramento are job classifications defined by collective bargaining agreements, which
are based on the complexity of workers’ tasks and, in some circumstances, also on qual-
ifications and seniority levels. It follows that such job titles can be considered similar to
occupations, with the important differences that, depending on the sector of activity, the
same type of job could be classified in more than one livello di inquadramento and that
for each of these groups a sector-specific binding minimum wage applies.
In 1993 a major reform of collective bargaining was approved, in order to achieve the
following main objectives (Casadio [2003]): (i) coordination across industries and moder-
ation on wage growth to achieve low inflation targets; (ii) growth of regional differences
in wages to adapt them better to the heterogeneous cost of living and labour market con-
ditions at the local level; (iii) distribution of premiums related to performance (on top of
the sectoral minimums) and negotiation at the firm-level of some other contractual pro-
visions not related to compensation. This reform resulted in an increase of geographical
differences in top-up components of negotiated wages. However, Devicienti et al. [2008]
find that, overall, the amount of flexibility in bargaining agreements introduced by the
1993 reform has been quite limited. In particular, using a sample covering around 60% of
national private-sector contracts, these authors show that the average share of all top-up
components over total wages increased from around 18% during the mid-1980s, to only
22% by the end of the 1990s.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the long-run evolution of the standard deviation of log
weekly wages, computed from the social security records of male private sector workers
in Veneto (the data are presented in the next section). It can be noticed that inequali-
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ties declined sharply until around 1983. Previous research has attributed this remarkable
trend to the strong compressing effects of the Scala Mobile (e.g. Leonardi et al. [2015]
and Manacorda [2004]).
The Scala Mobile was a cost-of-living allowance added quarterly to the bargained con-
tractual minimum wages. The institution was in place from the 1970s until 1993, but was
weakened and extensively reformed in 1984 and then through a referendum in 1985. Since
this wage-adjustment mechanism had been particularly disadvantageous for more quali-
fied white-collars and skilled workers, from 1987 on most nation-wide collective bargaining
agreements attempted at further mitigating its egalitarian effects. As a consequence, the
compensations associated to the qualifications embedded in each livello di inquadramento
were improved, widening the gaps in the minimum wages stipulated for each of these job
titles (this tendency is highlighted by industrial relations reports of the time, such as
CESOS [1989]). Figure 1 shows indeed that the period between the early 1980s and early
2000s, the one on which we focus our analysis, is instead characterized by a very persistent
growth in pay inequality. Notice however that during the most recent years, as overall
wage dispersion reaches levels similar to those of the 1970s (before the introduction of the
Scala Mobile), this trend of growth actually stops.
3 Data and Preliminary Evidences on Inequality
3.1 Choice of the Data and of the Time Period
The Veneto Working Histories (VWH) database, which is studied here, contains earn-
ings data from social security records for all dependent workers of the private sector in
the Veneto region. The database covers the population of private sector firms that are
registered in one of Veneto’s INPS agencies, and the population of their employees. The
career of workers in these firms is observed also if they have job spells outside of the
Veneto region, as long as they are working in the private-sector. They are instead not
observed if they work in the public-sector or as self-employed. In order to analyse a more
homogeneous and consistent sample across time, we have divided the data by gender and,
throughout this paper, we discuss only results obtained among men. This choice allows us
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to compare more easily our results to evidences available in other studies (most notably
Card et al. [2013]) and it eases their interpretation, given that the dynamic of female
labour force participation is quite different from men’s one.
To our aims, Veneto represents a particularly informative case-study. This region has a
well-developed manufacturing sector, close-to-natural unemployment rates, limited out-
migration and it is fairly large, given that its economy represents around 10% of the
national GDP. These features makes it quite comparable to other well developed western
economies exposed to international competition and technological advances, most notably
West Germany. Studying inequalities considering only one region of Italy is convenient
also because different rates of economic growth have been observed across the country
(particularly between the North and the South) and it can be difficult to account for
genuine adjustments of wages to local market conditions. On this topic, Devicienti et al.
[2008] show that, after the 1993 industrial relations reform, wages started to adapt better
to economic conditions at the regional level, leading to a tenuous “resurrection” of the
Italian wage curve.
The original version of VWH covers the period from 1975 to 2001, and hence would not
allow us to document the developments in wage inequality for the most recent years.
However, we argue that neither the focus on a single region nor on the period that ends in
early 2000s are significant limitations for the paper’s aims and analysis. To show that this
is indeed the case, we complement our analysis based on VWH with evidences from the
recently available country-level matched employer-employee VisitINPS database, which
contains the universe of Italian social security records for private-sector employees.2 This
allows us to both compute inequality in Veneto for the extend 1975-2015 period (as in our
Figure 1), and to compare wage inequality developments in Veneto and in Italy across
the (shorter) 1983-2015 period.
We can summarize some initial evidence obtained from the two databases as follows.
First, the main inequality trends observed in Veneto are similar to those obtained from
the national population of social security records. Figure 2 compares the standard de-
viation of daily wages observed in Italy and in Veneto, as derived from the VisitINPS
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data. In computing both series, we have selected job spells longer than four months and
excluded wages below the first and above the 99th percentiles. The level of this statistic
is lower when computed considering only Veneto’s firms, an evidence mostly attributable
to the relevant regional differences in economic conditions across Italy. However, when
considering the trend in wage dispersion, which is provided in the right panel of the figure,
a fairly similar pattern between the two series emerges. Second, according to Figure 2, in
both Veneto and Italy wage dispersion increases quite persistently from the early 1980s
up until the early 2000s, but this trend is followed by a period of flat or negative growth
until the most recent years. Therefore, the years more carefully studied in this work (from
the early 1980s until the early 2000s) coincide with the only episode of growth in inequal-
ities observed in Italy since the 1970s. Arguably, this also represents the most interesting
period for an analysis of the evolution of the wage structure in the Italian case. Finally,
as we show in section 4.3, even the trends in the various AKM variance components are
similar between Veneto and Italy (see in particular Table 3).
3.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
The VWH data gathers information on pay gross of taxes and inclusive of all cash ben-
efits, but it excludes all in-kind benefits. We choose log gross daily wages, adjusted to
the 2003 level, as the unit of measurement for earnings. Other available alternatives (e.g.
weekly or monthly wages) are less precise in controlling for time worked since, by the law,
employers have to report all weeks and months during which an employee has worked at
least one day.
We have taken a number of steps that are relatively standard in the literature using similar
data. First, for each employee with multiple jobs during the same year, we have selected
the longest spell in terms of months, weeks and days worked; to break the few remaining
ties, we have selected the spell with highest earnings. Second, we have excluded from the
sample all spells shorter than approximately four months (16 weeks) and, finally, we have
trimmed wages at the 1st and 99th percentiles calculated over a six-year period.
In the rest of the paper we study in detail the years from 1982 to 2001, since our main
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purpose is to shed light on the determinants of the inequality growth, which takes place
during this most recent period. To estimate the two-way fixed effect model of Abowd
et al. [1999] we have divided the 1982-2001 years of data into five, partially overlapping,
six-years panels. All the results derived from the VWH database are computed consider-
ing only firms of Veneto, but we have included employment spells outside this region in
the estimation sample of the two-way fixed effect model. The rationale of these choices is
further discussed in the section providing the details of our econometric method.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for each of the five panels that we have constructed.
It emerges that the composition of the sample is quite homogeneous across periods. Given
that public-sector workers, self-employed and firms with no dependent workers are ex-
cluded from the social security archives, the secondary sector is relatively large and this
pattern is reflected in the occupational composition of the sample, where the majority
of individuals are blue-collars. Notice that secondary sector is defined as manufacturing
and constructions, the primary sector as agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining, while
the service sector is defined as the residual category. Tenure is left-censored at the year
1975, but, to correct for this problem, in the empirical analysis we control for this variable
by including dummy variables for its first six years, leaving higher seniority levels as the
reference category. The percentage of part time contracts is relatively low and it grows
over time, a tendency attributable to the fact that such contracts have been introduced in
the Italian legislation only since 1985. Finally, Table 1 shows that real wages have been
quite flat during the overall period considered, while their dispersion, as measured by the
standard deviation, steadily increases. In the next paragraph, we present a more accurate
description of this trend.
3.3 Preliminary Evidences on Inequality
Figure 3 describes the evolution of log daily wages at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles
of the earning distribution. It can be noticed that the 50th-10th and 90th-50th wage per-
centile ratios have all increased. Another evidence is the very flat growth of wage levels at
the bottom of the distribution. In particular, men’s earnings at the 10th percentile have
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remained stable over the whole period, while median wages have risen by only slightly
less than 10%. Instead, the 90th percentile of the pay distribution has risen by more than
25% in real terms, even if it has been stagnating during most of the 1990s.
In the left panel of Figure 4, using a method similar to Card et al. [2013], we test the
predictive performance of a series of log-linear conditional wage models. To construct this
figure, we have run year-by-year OLS regressions on the workers of firms located in Veneto,
using different sets of controls. The highest line represents the unconditional log wage
standard deviation. The other lines represent the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the
regressions. In each model, we have used the same set of baseline covariates, namely: a
quadratic term in age, occupation dummies, tenure dummies, log of firm size (number of
employees), around thirty sector fixed effects, national industry-wide collective contract
fixed effects, a set of interactions (age with occupation and age with tenure).
In addition to these covariates, each regression model is fully saturated for one of the fol-
lowing categories: (1) job titles (livelli di inquadramento), (2) firms or (3) both. National
industry-wide collective contract fixed effects are not collinear with livelli di inquadra-
mento, since the latter are specific job titles (usually between five and ten) defined by
the former. Instead, firm fixed effects are collinear with sectors and, typically at least,
also with industry-wide contracts. The procedure adopted in constructing job title and
collective contract fixed effects is discussed in more detail in Section 5.
In general, the trend in residual wage standard deviation (RMSE) is fairly flat, while total
pay dispersion shows a clear increasing pattern. Therefore, workforce composition and re-
turns to its characteristics do a good job in explaining the rise in wage standard deviation
over time, as they become increasingly relevant over time. Only a fairly small proportion
of the unconditional wage variation remains unexplained when we estimate a model fully
saturated for job titles and firms. Firm fixed effect explain a greater proportion of wage
variation than job title fixed effects. However, when focusing on the evolution of the
RMSE across time, the same pattern does not hold.
In order to better compare the evolution of the relative performance of each of the three
regression specifications, in the right panel of Figure 4 we normalize each year-specific
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RMSE to the 1982 level of the corresponding model. In interpreting the graph, notice
that the absolute predictive performance of a model has to be evaluated with respect to
the unconditional wage variance. The right panel of Figure 4 is useful in order to com-
pare the relative predictive performance of a model with respect to the others, but not
the absolute one, which indeed tends to grow over time for all specifications.
When considering the right panel of the figure, a clear pattern emerges, as over time
the explanatory power of fixed effects for job titles gains importance with respect to the
models where firm effects are controlled for. Thus, we interpret this result as a prelimi-
nary evidence of the importance of collective bargaining in shaping the evolution of pay
dispersion. In Section 5, employing a more informative regression framework, we analyse
this point in more detail.
4 Decomposition of the Wage Structure Using the AKM Regression Model
4.1 Econometric Methodology
The contributions of firm-specific, time-constant and time-varying components of wages
to raising inequality are identified relying on the higher-dimensional linear panel model of
Abowd et al. [1999] (we also refer to this method as two-way fixed effects model or AKM
regression). In order to make inter-temporal comparisons, we adopt the same strategy of
Card et al. [2013], dividing the years under study into different sub-periods.
Let i index a specific worker, t the time period, and j = ι(i, t) the firm in which i is
working at t. Moreover, let yi represent a T × 1 vector of log wages, xi a T ×P matrix of
time- and firm-varying individual characteristics. Then, the two-way fixed effects model
can be specified as follows
yit = xitβ + φj + ηi + eit
where yit and xit are rows of yi and xi, β is a P × 1 vector of parameters, while φj and ηi
are respectively firm-constant and time-constant components of individual wages, which
are allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with any of the characteristics in xi, and which
could be not perfectly observable. We will often refer to ηi with the term unobserved
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individual heterogeneity, and to φj with firm wage premium or firm wage policy.
In the above equation eit is the error term, which we assume to have an expected value
equal to zero in all periods. As in Card et al. [2013], we assume that innovations in workers’
unobserved earning abilities (which enter in eit) have mean zero for each individual, but
contain a unit root. Match-specific effects, which could arise due to productivity shocks
associated to particular job matches, are assumed to have mean zero for each firm and
worker in the sample interval. In Section 4.2 we show that including match fixed effects
provides only marginal gains in the overall fit of the model, suggesting that the size of
these idiosyncratic components is quite limited overall. Finally, we assume that eit is not
correlated with any of the elements in xi, φj and ηi. This restriction, which we define as
strict exogeneity, can be stated formally as
E
[
eit|xis, φj=ι(i,s), ηi
]
= 0 ∀ s, t
The above assumption rules out any pattern of endogenous mobility of workers between
firms. Any realization of ι(i, s) = j should be uncorrelated with ei,t, so that, for example,
negative idiosyncratic shocks in wages should not lead to mobility towards a certain type
of firms. However, notice that correlation between ι(.) and ηi or φj is allowed under strict
exogeneity. If this assumption holds, the model can be consistently estimated by OLS,
via inclusion of dummies for individuals’ and firms’ effects.
Card et al. [2013] develop several tests to support the validity of the strict exogeneity as-
sumption and the additive separability of firm and worker effects. These tests have been
conducted on German data (Card et al. [2013]), Portuguese data (Card et al. [2016]) and
also on Italian Social Security earnings data, albeit for a matched sample of large firms
only (above 50 employees; see, Macis and Schivardi [2016]). All papers find no evidence
in support of the endogenous workers’ mobility hypothesis and conclude that the AKM
model provides a good approximation of the wage process. In an online appendix, we
compute several of these tests on the VWH data, showing evidences that do not support
the presence of mis-specifications or endogenous mobility patterns.
The baseline control variables included in the AKM model are a cubic polynomial in age,
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a dummy for part-time workers, three dummies for occupation, dummies for the first five
years of tenure and a full set of time fixed effects.3 To account better for the seniority
profile of earnings, we interact the age polynomial and tenure dummies with and occupa-
tion fixed effects.
Workers’ fixed effects measure the personal earning ability that is constant over time and
is largely portable as individuals move to other firms during their labour market career.
Instead, firm fixed effects measure how much differences in wages paid by observationally
similar employers matter, keeping constant employee time-constant characteristics and
other observable factors. Unlike a simple average of the workers’ wages in the firm, φj can
be interpreted as a firm-specific wage policy because the AKM model controls for worker
observed and unobserved heterogeneity, and hence accounts for the potential non-random
sorting of workers to firms. However, firms’ wage premiums can not be directly interpreted
as indexes of efficiency or performance (Eeckhout and Kircher [2011]). Nevertheless, since
the focus of this analysis is on the determinants of wage dispersion, rather than on firms’
performance variability, the parameter φj is still highly informative for our purposes.
There are several reasons why similar firms may adopt differentiated wage policies. As
highlighted by a vast stream of literature, firms could offer efficiency wages (Akerlof
[1982]), or they could adopt a so-called wage posting behaviour, offering higher wages in
order to reduce the cost of vacancies (Burdett and Mortensen [1998]). Moreover, firms
could differ in the degree of rent-sharing, a phenomenon which Card et al. [2014] found
to be small, but significant in magnitude, in the labour market analysed here.
In the AKM regression each firm wage effect is computed with respect to an arbitrary
reference category and, as shown by Abowd et al. [2002], it is identified only by workers
who changed at least one employer within a given connected set. This is the group con-
taining all workers who ever worked for any of the firms in the group, and all the firms
at which any of the workers in the group were ever employed. As in Card et al. [2013],
we have dropped observations outside of the largest connected set of firms, a restriction
that implies the loss of an extremely small proportion of observations (around 1-2 %,
depending on the period of observation).
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The estimates of firms wage premiums could be biased whenever mobility across work-
places is low and the entire workforce is not observable (Andrews et al. [2008]). For this
reason, we report the main results including only for firms located in Veneto, i.e. those for
which we can observe all their employees. However, firms outside this region are included
in the regression, since otherwise we would have a loss in efficiency due to the exclusion
of observable job mobility episodes from the estimation sample.
Given the linearity of our panel model, and under the assumption of strict exogeneity, the
total variance of log wages can be decomposed as follows
Var(yit) = Var(φj=ι(i,t)) + Var(ηi) + Var(xitβ) + Var(εit)+
+ 2Cov(φj=ι(i,t), xitβ) + 2Cov(φj=ι(i,t), ηi) + 2Cov(ηi, xitβ) (1)
Thus, we can measure which are, among firm-specific, time-constant and observable time-
varying factors, the main drivers of wage dispersion, and which forces lessen their mag-
nitude over time. With the exception of the error term, the effect of each component
on the total variance is mediated by the covariance terms. Of particular interest are the
covariances associated to firms’ pay premiums, since they measure positive or negative
sorting of workers’ earning ability into types of firms adopting specific wage policies.
The term Cov(ηi, xitβ) measures whether workers with higher wage components related to
observable time-varying characteristics exhibit higher or lower time-constant unobserved
heterogeneity. In practice it is often difficult to provide an economic intuition for which
human capital factors are absorbed by unobserved heterogeneity, and what drives the
sorting between time-varying and time-constant characteristics of workers, since to some
extent Cov(ηi, xitβ) is also determined by how well given workers’ skills are measured by
the time-varying characteristics included in the regression. Therefore, in presenting our
results we more often rely on the following, more parsimonious decomposition
Var(yit) = Var(φj=ι(i,t)) + Var(ηi + xitβ) + Var(εit) + 2Cov(φj=ι(i,t), xitβ + ηi) (2)
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In equation (2) the term Var(ηi +xitβ) captures the joint effect of workers’ time-constant
and (observable) time-varying characteristics on the total wage variance, conditional on
firm-specific factors. The variability of the term (ηi + xitβ) (which we also call workers’
portable pay component or workers’ wage premium) provides a more concise information
and has the advantage of avoiding an often data-driven and arbitrary division of time-
constant and time-varying human capital factors. For this reason, the analyses that
follows often refer to this term only.
4.2 Variance Decomposition from the AKM Regressions
We have calculated the variance decomposition of equation (1) on five, partially overlap-
ping, six-years panels. In each panel, we have computed two-way fixed effects regressions
controlling for human capital and aggregate shocks in wages. The coefficients associated to
the regressors included in xit were all significant and had the expected sign. The adjusted
R-squared ranged between 0.87 and 0.93. For each panel, Table A.1 (in the Appendix)
reports the detailed AKM wage variance decomposition, as well as a comparison of these
results with a model saturated with match fixed effects. Notice that the fit of the latter
model is only marginally better, while the variance of match effects does not contribute
to the growth of pay dispersion, as it is relatively constant across time. Overall, these
results suggest that the additively separable specification of the AKM model provides a
good approximation to the wage process.
During the overall period considered, the total wage variance, as computed on each six-
years sample, has increased from 0.082 to 0.124, growing by around 40%. In each period,
the largest contribution to the total variance derives from the joint effect of worker het-
erogeneity, both observed and unobserved. Moreover, the variance of ηi dominates the
variance of xitβ, while the covariance of these two terms is always small and positive.
The component related to firms’ wage premiums provides a smaller contribution to over-
all wage dispersion than worker’s heterogeneity. Importantly, employers’ pay policies are
more relevant in the first period of the sample (1982-1987), but lose importance thereafter.
The estimated correlation between firm wage effects and worker’s heterogeneity, consider-
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ing both its observed and unobserved components, is increasing over time. Hence, there is
a significant tendency towards more positive sorting of firms’ wage premiums with work-
ers’ overall human capital.
To show these trends more clearly, Table 2 reports the decomposition of equation (2),
computed in the first and in the last panel only. It emerges that during both periods
(1982-1987 and 1996-2001) the most important determinant of total wage dispersion is
the variance of the term (ηi + xitβ), which constitutes around three fourth of the total
pay variance. The lower part of Table 2 shows the evolution of earning dispersion from
the earliest to the latest panel. For each pay dispersion component, we have computed
the difference across samples, the percentage change, and the contribution of this change
as a percentage of the growth in the total wage variance.
Between the 1982-87 and 1996-01 periods, the total wage variance has risen by more than
40%. Around 60% of this growth is driven by higher dispersion in our comprehensive mea-
sure of workers’ earning ability. On the contrary, the dispersion in firms’ wage premiums
declines between the first and the last panel, providing a negative contribution of about
12% to the growth in wage dispersion. Finally, increasing assortative matching between
highly paid workers and better paying firms provides another positive contribution to the
growth in inequalities. This component represents around 60% of the total trend, even if
the correlation between individual skills and φj is relatively small and close to zero in all
sub-periods.
We interpret raising assortativeness as the result of at least two tendencies. First, it is
tempting to relate the growth in sorting to some evolutions occurred in the Italian labour
market and in its legislation since the 1980s. In common with other EU countries, Italy
has indeed experienced a general trend of labour market modernization and liberalization
that has touched upon virtually all aspects of labour market regulations. This process
may have gradually reduced search and matching frictions, eventually improving alloca-
tive efficiency. For instance, during the 1980s manual workers had to be selected almost
exclusively from the unemployment workers’ lists held by the public employment service,
and not via direct selection mechanisms, as the hiring process was fully liberalized only in
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the early 1990s. Similarly, in the 1980s hiring typically involved only open-end contracts,
while temporary contracts were gradually liberalized only starting from the second half
of the 1990s (on this respect, notice however that the growth in sorting characterizes also
the years prior to this reform).4
A second set of potential mechanisms behind the growth in sorting is more mechanical
and linked to the growth in the dispersion of human capital. In particular, a rise in rel-
ative wages of skilled workers may induce greater sorting in a market where assortative
matching is (slightly) positive to being with. Moreover, since by construction the mea-
surement error of ηi and φj are negatively correlated, and this induces a downward bias
on estimates of Cov(ηi, φj) derived from AKM-style regressions (Andrews et al. [2008]),
a growth in the relative wage of skilled workers, by reducing the measurement error of
unobserved abilities, may induce a rise in the covariance term. Unfortunately, with wage
data alone, it is difficult to provide more nuanced tests on the relative importance of the
various mechanisms mentioned above. The issue of sorting, and of the determinants of
its changes over time, is a key area for future research.
In the next section we turn the discussion on how changes in the industrial relation sys-
tem might have had a more direct bearing on the other two main findings of the paper,
i.e. declining dispersion in firm wage policies and positive contribution of worker-specific
wage components to the overall inequality growth. In doing so, it is useful to assess the
experience of the second largest manufacturing economy in Europe (Italy) in light of what
has already been documented for its manufacturing leader (Germany).
4.3 Wage Inequality and Institutions: A Comparative Perspective
Since we have used a sampling strategy and a method similar to the one that has been
applied by Card et al. [2013] on German data, it is particularly interesting to compare
their evidence with that provided in our study. Moreover, in order to test whether the
case of Veneto can be considered coherent with tendencies observed at the nation-wide
level, we also compare our results to those obtained by estimating an AKM variance de-
composition on the nation-wide visitINPS data.
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Table 3 reports the decomposition of equation (2) applied on the VWH sample, on visit-
INPS data and that derived from the results of Card et al. [2013], considering comparable
periods of time. As can be noticed, the level of the variance in Veneto is always lower
than in West Germany and in Italy. However, when considering the evolution over time,
it emerges that male wage dispersion increases at a fairly similar pace in the three sam-
ples. This result is in part driven by the choice of the time period, as Card et al. [2013]
document a persistent rising trend in pay inequality up to 2008, while evidences provided
by Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that in Italy this growth lasts only up to the early 2000s.
Table 3 shows that, remarkably, the determinants of inequality trends are very similar
in Veneto and Italy, but they are quite different when compared with German results.
Card et al. [2013] show that, considering differences between the first and the last period,
only 34% of the total growth in wage variance can be attributed to greater individual
heterogeneity dispersion, while the same amount is more than 60% in the case of Veneto
and more than 70% in Italy. Between the same periods, firms’ pay premiums dispersion
rose by almost 25% in Germany, while it has reduced by around 7% in Veneto and 6%
in Italy. Finally, Card et al. [2013] also find that the sorting between firm-specific and
employee-specific pay premiums contributed for another 36% to the overall growth in
earnings inequality, which is a weaker figure than what we have documented for Italy
(42%) and Veneto (55.9%).
Card et al. [2013] link their findings, and in particular the growth in firms’ wage policies
dispersion, to the major changes occurred in the German industrial relation system since
the early 1990s. As discussed by Dustmann et al. [2009], rather than in legislation re-
forms, such changes were laid out in contracts and mutual agreements between employer
associations, trade unions and works councils. In response to the challenges of the post-
reunification period (e.g., increasing threats of firms’ off-shoring and massive migration
flows), these actors allowed for an unprecedented decentralization of the German wage-
setting process since the early 1990s. Deviations from industry-wide agreements through
“opting-out”, “opening” or “hardship” clauses were all increasingly used, even though
the dominating system of industry-wide bargaining basically remained unchanged. On
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this respect, Card et al. [2013] observe that firms’ pay premiums, as computed on the
1996-2002 sample, are disproportionally lower among establishments that had opted out
from national collective agreements, a tendency that enlarges the overall dispersion in
such wage components. Thus, in Germany the growth in the variance of firm-specific
wage policies (Var(φj)) was associated to a growth in the share of workers not covered
by any kind of union agreement and to a rise in the number of firm-level deviations from
industry-wide union agreements.
Italy’s system of industrial relations shares many features of the German one, particu-
larly for what concerns the importance of industry-wide collective bargaining. However,
in many respects the Italian system has not shown the flexibility demonstrated by the
German one, nor have the reforms occurred in Italy during the mid 1990s significantly
weakened the influence of collective bargaining on wage setting. Italian firms have never
been able to opt-out from the industry-wide settlements, adjusting wages downwardly
whenever the local or firm-specific economic conditions so required (see Section 2). This
may explain why, unlike in the German case, the variance of Italian firms’ wage policies
has not widened over time, despite the fact that also Italy has been exposed to the long-
run challenges posed by the introduction of new technologies and increased international
competition.
Notice that, according to our estimates, the variance of firm wage policies actually de-
creased from the mid 1980s to the early 2000s. Unable to deviate from the industry-set
minimum wages, Italian firms could still have resorted to incremental firm-level wage
bargaining to differentiate their firm wage policies. Our data do not allow us to ob-
serve which firms or workers were covered by firm-level agreements. Nevertheless, the
available evidence suggests that the incidence of firm-level agreements declined over time
(e.g., Sestito and Rossi [2000]), partly as a consequence of a reduction in unionisation
rates, as shown for Veneto by Vaona [2006]. The resulting standardization of compensa-
tion schemes across employers is consistent with our finding of a decreasing dispersion in
firms’ pay policies.
Table 3 shows that the dispersion of observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity
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has instead been a major contributing factor to the overall wage inequality growth in the
Italian case. While in principle this trend may reflect the underlying labour market forces,
e.g. demand and supply of skills, in the following section we argue that such market forces
have been largely “channelled” into the tight tracks set by the Italian system of industrial
relations, particularly through the sectoral-level bargaining process. We do so by showing
that the growth in individual heterogeneity dispersion has been almost entirely driven by
broadened differences in pay between the job title categories (livelli di inquadramento)
defined by industry-wide collective contracts.
5 The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Wage and Human Capital Disper-
sion
5.1 Variance Decomposition Method
This section shows that overall pay dispersion is mostly determined by between job titles
earning variability and it links this outcome to the evolutions occurred within collec-
tive bargaining agreements. For this purpose, we have applied a variance decomposition
methodology that divides total variation of a given quantity, which is partitioned into
groups, into differences between groups and differences between members of the same
group.
Keeping fixed a given period t, let yij represent wages (or another quantity of interest) of
worker i in group j, let n be the total number of workers, let J be the number of groups,
and let nj be the set of employees in group j. Define ȳj as the average level of wages
within group j, and define the within group variance as
Vj = (‖nj‖ − 1)−1
∑
i∈nj
(yit − ȳj)2
where we indicate by ‖nj‖ the cardinality of the set nj (i.e. the number of employees in
group j). Using the above notation, we can decompose the total wage variance into a
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within group component, and a between group component as follows
Var(y) =
1
n− 1

J∑
j=1
(‖nj‖ − 1)Vj︸ ︷︷ ︸
within component
+
J∑
j=1
‖nj‖ (ȳj − ȳ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
between component
 (3)
The next paragraph presents results obtained by using livelli di inquadramento, as defined
by collective bargaining institutions, to partition the population. In Section 5.3 we apply
the same decomposition using firms to define groups j in equation (3). The discussion
of potential mechanisms driving the respective within and between components of the
variance are provided in each of these paragraphs.
Since the term (ηi + xitβ) in the AKM regression model is one of the main determinants
of inequality, we have applied the decomposition technique defined above on this worker’s
portable wage component. For comparison we have also applied the same procedure on
total wages. Notice that when the variance of total wages is decomposed across time, the
resulting trend provides a composite effect, i.e. it is the result of both, greater sorting,
greater human capital dispersion, and relatively stable firms’ wage policies dispersion (see
Table 2).
5.2 Wage Components Dispersion Within and Between Job Titles
In the Italian system of industrial relations, the allocation of a worker to a given livello
di inquadramento is typically related to the tasks performed at work and to other time-
invariant personal characteristics, mostly captured by the fixed effect embedded in the
workers’ portable pay component. The effect of promotion to higher ladders of the scale,
as well as the (fairly automatic) seniority wage premiums stipulated at each ladder by the
relevant collective contract, are reflected in the time-varying component of the estimated
worker premium. Individual firms can affect pay differentials between livelli di inquadra-
mento only for what concerns the part above the statutory minimum wages, which are set
at the industry-wide level. Moreover, by the law employers are not allowed to downgrade
workers into less remunerative job titles, an element providing further rigidity in firms’
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wage adjustment decisions.
Given this institutional context, the between job titles variance in workers’ portable wage
components can be considered an informative parameter to quantify the impact of col-
lective bargaining on wages. A different measure is proposed by Torres et al. [2013], who
directly include occupation dummies in an AKM model to study the effect of job title
membership on wages. However, in the Italian context, our approach is more suitable for
studying the influence of collective bargaining on wage dynamics, since the rules for as-
signing each worker to a job title are set by the relevant collective contract and can change
over time. For example, several managerial occupations have started to be regulated by
autonomous industry-wide collective contracts since the end of the 1980s. The resulting
shift in the segregation of workers across minimum wage levels defined by collective con-
tracts is a source of challenges on how to compare and interpret the variance of job title
fixed effects across time. Instead, the proposed variance decomposition, computed on a
yearly basis, allows to capture to a full extent such institutionally-driven shifts in the
segregation of workers across various minimum wage levels.
Before presenting the decomposition results, we provide further information on how livelli
di inquadramento have been identified in the data. As mentioned in Section 2, several
economic activities, despite being similar in their nature, can be regulated by more than
one collective contract and the number of such industry-wide agreements, as well as the
number of job titles defined by them, can change over time. Therefore, we have not
attempted at harmonizing the definition of job titles across years. We have instead con-
sidered the year-specific definition of livelli di inquadramento, based on their classification
code. As an inclusion rule, we have adopted the criteria of considering as a legitimate
job title only those for which at least 150 observations were present in a given year in
the largest connected set of Veneto firms.5 The total number of livelli di inquadramento
included in the decompositions ranges between 435 (in 2001) and 520 (in 1984). Moreover,
the percentage of observations which we have been able to include in our decompositions,
ranges between 83% of the total in 2001 and 69% in 1986.
Figure 5 reports the results of the variance decomposition of wages (left panel) and human
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capital (right panel) into a between- and a within-job titles components applied year-by-
year. Given that the sum of the two series provides the total variance, the growth in the
dispersion of raw wages represents the composite effect of greater sorting of better paid
workers to better paying firms and of individual heterogeneity (see Table 2), while the
right panel of the figure gives the evolution of the latter component only. Both graphs
show that practically all of the growth in the dispersion of wages and of workers’ portable
wage components is accounted for by increased variability between livelli di inquadra-
mento. Indeed, both in the case of unconditional wages and of individual heterogeneity,
the between part of the total variance shows a growing trend, with the partial exception
of the second half of the 1990s, while the within component is persistently flat. As a
consequence, in relative terms this latter source of variation looses importance as a deter-
minant of overall inequality.
Figure 6 reports the evolution of between- and within-job titles workers’ wage premiums
dispersion by sector (secondary and tertiary) and by broad occupation (white and blue
collars), computed by normalizing the 1982 levels of dispersion to 100. A trend similar
to the one implied by the right panel of Figure 5 is observed for all categories of workers,
but the growth of between job titles dispersion in human capital is considerably stronger
among production workers and in the secondary sector. In the next section we show that,
even if the pace of growth in workers’ heterogeneity dispersion is different across sectors,
it is not driven by a handful of (secondary sector and low skilled) industries. Indeed, as
we discuss below, the growth in this component of the wage variance is entirely driven by
within firms dispersion.
Two main mechanisms could explain the trend toward higher between-job titles differ-
ences in wages. First, subsequent rounds of collective bargaining may have enlarged the
gaps between in the job-title pay scale. Alternatively, firms may have simply increasingly
assigned employees to higher (lower) inquadramento levels, as a way to raise (lessen) the
base wage of workers. Below we provide evidence on the relative role of these two mech-
anisms. The left panel of Figure 7 shows the proportion of workers within each quartile
of the job titles’ average wage distribution, while the right panel shows the same statistic
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using the average workers’ heterogeneity distribution. In constructing the graph, we have
computed year-by-year the average wage (or its portable component) within each job title,
separately considering workers in the secondary and tertiary sectors. For each of these
two sectors, we have classified each job title according to the quartile of the job titles’
average pay distribution to which it belongs. Then, we have computed year-by-year the
proportion of workers within each quartile group of job titles. Notice that, since we have
not weighted this distribution by the number of observations within each job title, a given
percentile of the job titles’ average pay distribution can be quite different from the same
percentile of the wage distribution.
The left panel of Figure 7 shows that the proportion of workers within each quartile of the
job title pay distribution has been fairly constant during the overall period considered.
There are some exceptions to this general trend, but most discrepancies across time tend
to be year-specific and small in magnitude. Moreover, they may in part be attributed to
differences in the job title classification codes from one year to the other. The right panel
of Figure 7 shows that even when differences in employers’ wage policies are controlled for
in defining job titles quartiles, most tendencies remain similar to the ones provided in the
left panel. Overall, by analysing the composition of job title categories across time, we
can conclude that the main channel driving greater wage dispersion is linked to differences
in how the same occupations are rewarded across time. Thus, there are no clear evidences
of a process of polarization of the workforce.
To sum up, increased differences in minimum wage levels and seniority premiums set for
each livello di inquadramento are the most likely drivers of the growth of Italian pay
dispersion observed from the 1980s until the early 2000s. Indeed, almost all of the in-
equality growth has arisen from differences in pay between these job titles. It remains
unclear to which extent institutions have simply reacted to market forces, or whether
they have represented a distortion to the wage structure. Some hypothesis on the relative
importance of market-driven and institutions-driven mechanisms are further tested in the
next paragraph, where we consider the role of workers’ segregation across firms. Never-
theless, we can conclude that the growth in Italian wage inequality has been allowed by
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the opening of the pay gaps between the various livelli di inquadramento stipulated in a
fairly centralized way at each industry-wide contract renewal, combined with the gradual
dismantling of the egalitarian wage indexation system since the mid 1980s.
5.3 Wage Components Dispersion and Segregation Across Firms
The growth of pay differentials between job titles, which we have just documented, could
also derive from a process of segregation of the more qualified workers into given en-
claves of firms. Such market-driven process would then probably be reflected in collective
bargaining dynamics, given that more skill-intensive firms could be able to grant better
economic conditions to selected groups of job titles. On the other hand, if this segregation
is low, despite a general growth in job title heterogeneity, we may think that employers
are constrained by the sectoral bargaining standards, given that most of the growth in
the dispersion of human capital occurs within establishments, instead of across them. We
test this hypothesis computing year-by-year the decomposition of equation (3), this time
using firms as the partitioning group of the population.
Figure 8 reports the within- and between-firms variance decomposition, applied on wages
and on the estimated individual heterogeneity of the workforce. The left panel of the
figure shows that raw wage variation is almost equally split into a within- and a between-
firms component. Given the results emerged from the AKM variance decomposition (see
in particular Table 2), the growth across time in the unconditional wage variance between
firms can be entirely ascribed to increased sorting of workers’ wage premiums with firms’
pay premiums. Indeed, there is no evidence of increased dispersion of firms’ pay policies.
In the right panel of Figure 8 we compute the same variance decomposition using workers’
wage premiums alone, instead of total wages. This exercise allows to test whether the
segregation of workers’ earning abilities across firms has increased, or whether differences
in this component of the total variance have been growing mostly within workplaces and
among co-workers. It emerges that the dispersion of human capital between employers has
been persistently flat over the entire period considered. Therefore, we find no evidence of
greater segregation of workers’ skills across employers, as the growth in the variance of
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this wage component is entirely driven by within firms heterogeneity.
The low level of segregation in human capital across workplaces documented here is coher-
ent with previous studies on Italy (such as Iranzo et al. [2008]), but it is a quite peculiar
result when compared with evidences available for other European countries and the US
(e.g. see Faggio et al. [2010] on UK, Card et al. [2013] on Germany and Barth et al.
[2016] on US). Overall Italy is not characterized by strong dispersion in firms’ wage poli-
cies, and the distribution of workers has not shifted toward a more segregated structure,
where successful firms are able to attract the best employees, leaving out those who do
not have access to such networks. These two tendencies could have been relevant if, for
example, greater dispersion in productive performance across employers, often considered
an outcome of technological changes and international competition, had induced greater
heterogeneity in wages and workforce composition between plants.
Considering the importance of pay dispersion between job titles, which is documented by
Figure 5, together with the evidences just presented, we can conclude that the growth of
Italian pay inequality has entirely occurred within the collective bargaining framework.
That is to say, over the years the system of industrial relations has granted more hetero-
geneous conditions for selected categories of workers (i.e. job titles), while it has provided
limited margins of flexibility for the firms. Arguably, the flat growth in wage dispersion
observed from the early 2000s until the most recent years (see Figure 1 and Figure 2)
could be the consequence of more egalitarian tendencies emerged within this institution,
especially given its important role uncovered by our analysis and the absence of major
reforms in wage setting mechanisms characterizing this period.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the evolution of Italian wage inequality in the most recent
decades. We have documented that, after a period of strong wage compression taking
place in the 1970s, there has been a substantial growth in several measures of pay dis-
persion from the 1980s until the early 2000s and a relatively flat tendency since then. To
interpret this trend, we have analysed the period of growth in wage inequality decom-
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posing the wage variance into components capturing heterogeneity in firm pay policies,
heterogeneity in workers’ time-varying and time-constant characteristics, as well as their
sorting. We have relied mostly on matched employer-firm data from the Veneto region, a
large and self-contained labour market that shares several characteristics with the most
developed and manufacturing-oriented western countries. We have have found that earn-
ings dispersion has been mostly driven by differences in the workers’ portable component
of wages. Instead, the variability of employer-specific pay premiums has reduced over
time. Interestingly, when we replicate our analyses on the recently released data for the
entire territory, we find that the Veneto results are very similar to the ones obtained for
Italy as a whole, despite the large territorial differences that characterize the country.
Our results are different from evidences documented for other countries, and Germany
in particular. On this respect, we have provided an indirect support to the conclusions
of Card et al. [2013]. These authors report evidence of a growth in firms’ pay premiums
dispersion. They attribute this finding to firm-level deviations from the dispositions of
industry-wide collective agreements (e.g., the opting-out clauses), which were allowed by
the German system and became increasingly used since the mid 1990s. We have docu-
mented the lack of such a flexible adaptation process in a similar manufacturing-oriented
economy, which has undergone qualitatively different reforms in its system of industrial
relations. Italian firms have been unable to apply heterogeneous pay policies, and to
circumvent the constraints to wage dynamics imposed by the sectoral level of bargaining.
To shed further light on the role played by collective bargaining in the observed in-
equality trend, we have analysed the evolution of pay differentials across so-called livelli
di inquadramento, job titles defined by nation-wide sectoral collective agreements, for
which specific minimum wages apply regardless of a worker’s union membership. A sim-
ple variance-decomposition exercise allowed us to show that the increased dispersion in
wages, and in the workers’ portable component of wages, has almost entirely occurred
between such job titles.
In general, our results show that market forces have been largely “channelled” into the
tight tracks set by the rules governing the country’s fairly centralized system of industrial
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relations. Collective bargaining can also account for the episodic nature of the observed
increase in inequality. Our results suggest that minimum wage levels set at the industry-
wide level have become increasingly more dispersed during the 1980s and 1990s, and this
has been the main mechanism driving the growth of inequality in Italy. The most plau-
sible explanation for why unions and other actors of industrial relations pursued such
opening-up of the wage differentials is obtained by simply looking at the long-run evolu-
tion of wage inequality. During the 1970s the automatic wage-indexation clause known
as Scala Mobile produced a strong wage compression. This fostered resentment not only
among top-paid workers, but also on those at the middle of the hierarchy (on this topic,
see among other Manacorda [2004]). Our interpretation of the growth in wage inequality
that followed, between 1983 until the early 2000s, is as a sort of “compensation” for the
excessive compression of the previous decade. If so, one would expect that, once the
wages set in subsequent rounds of collective agreements has reached the “desired” level
of dispersion, the increasing trend in wage inequality would flatten out, which is exactly
what we document in the paper. After 2001 (and largely before the Great Recession)
Italian inequality has remained relatively stable.
Overall, there are some valuable lessons from our analysis. First, the specificities of a
country’s labour market institutions and system of industrial relations matter for the
developments of wage inequality, and they do so in more nuanced ways than typically
emphasised by the empirical literature. For the same reason, we should not expect that
countries subject to largely similar underlying market forces, e.g. related to globalization
and technological changes, should exhibit the same increasing pattern of wage inequality.
Since Italy is the second largest EU manufacturing economy and it is characterized by
wage setting institutions quite similar to those of other important countries (e.g. France),
we believe that the paper presents a notable case-study. Our analysis also provides a
method to test the relative importance of collective bargaining institutions in shaping
wage dynamics. This method has the potential to be applied in several European coun-
tries that are characterized by fairly centralized collective bargaining institutions.
Finally, we believe that important learning lessons can be drawn from the comparison
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of the Italian experience with that of Germany, a country that - despite the dominant
role of industry wage-bargaining - displayed an unexpected degree of flexibility and de-
centralization in its industrial relations system. According to Dustmann et al. (2014),
this factor has been important in boosting the German economic performance after the
early 2000s, albeit at the cost of more wage inequality. On this respect, our comparative
analysis informs the on-going debate on the relative merits and costs of decentralization
of wage bargaining in European countries.
Notes
1Other work on Italian wage inequality include Dell’Aringa and Lucifora [1994], Erickson and Ichino
[1995], Brandolini et al. [2002], Manacorda [2004], Naticchioni and Ricci [2009], Devicienti and Borgarello
[2001], Cappellari [2004], and Cappellari and Leonardi [2016]. Although they all emphasize the role on
Italian institutions and collective bargaining, none of them can study the AKM-based wage variance
decompositions, and its evolution over time, due to limitations in the type of data they use. AKM
models are estimated by e.g. Iranzo et al. [2008] and Macis and Schivardi [2016], but their focus is not
on the dynamics of wage inequality.
2The Veneto data are freely accessible to researchers through the Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti
(www.frdb.org). The data covering the entire territory is only accessible to researchers holding a small
number of competitive VisitINPS grants. See the VisitINPS Scholars section at https://www.inps.it
3Following Card et al. [2018], we identify all time effects by omitting the linear age term and we
include the higher order age terms in deviation from age 50.
4Fixed-term contracts were liberalized only after 1997, with the so-called Treu reform, and then in
2003 with the Biagi law. An evaluation of specific labour market interventions on sorting is beyond the
scope of the present paper, and, in general, it would be difficult to conduct, as there has been a constant
flux of often overlapping and across the board (i.e. for the entire private sector) reforms.
5This inclusion rule has been chosen to mitigate measurement error issues which are embedded in job
titles’ classification codes. When computing the variance decomposition using different thresholds, we
did not find great sensitivity in the results.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics (Mean and St. Dev.) by Period
Period 1982-1987 1984-1989 1988-1993 1992-1997 1996-2001
Log daily wages 4.783 4.803 4.860 4.873 4.883
St. Dev. 0.286 0.300 0.332 0.343 0.352
Age 36.76 36.37 35.946 35.84 35.82
St. Dev. 11.07 11.04 10.90 10.39 9.85
Firms’ workers 7.599 7.272 6.958 7.443 7.398
St. Dev. 43.76 48.72 38.17 51.38 52.50
Tenure 5.072 5.551 6.015 6.453 6.479
St. Dev. 3.631 4.325 5.494 6.252 6.823
Proportions
Part Time 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.018
Apprentice 0.015 0.020 0.024 0.024 0.035
Blue Collar 0.730 0.729 0.723 0.724 0.708
White Collar 0.247 0.243 0.242 0.245 0.250
Manager 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007
Primary Sect. 0.043 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.042
Secondary Sect. 0.626 0.631 0.648 0.651 0.662
Tertiary Sect. 0.331 0.324 0.307 0.305 0.296
Total Workers 698,410 724,459 753,529 776,988 846,633
Total Firms 65,019 72,689 80,301 80,869 85,402
The sample is composed of firms located in Veneto belonging to the largest connected set. Part-
time contracts have been introduced only since 1985. Tenure is censored at 1975. Average
firms’ size is non-weighted and measured by the number of employees working for at least six
months in a year
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Table 2: Decomposition of the Total Wage Variance Evolution
Period Var(φj)
Var(ηi +
xitβ)
Var(eit)
2Cov(φj , ηi+
xitβ)
TOTAL
VAR.
1982-1987 0.032 0.064 0.008 -0.022 0.082
% of Total 39.0 78.0 9.8 -26.8 100
1996-2001 0.027 0.089 0.007 0.003 0.124
% of Total 21.8 71.8 5.6 2.4 100
Difference -0.005 0.025 -0.001 0.025 0.042
% ∆ -16.9 32.7 -13.3 263.2 40.8
% ∆/∆TOT -11.9 59.5 -2.4 59.5 100.0
Percentage changes for a given quantity z from t− 1 to t are computed using a reference value
zr defined as zr =
|zt|+|zt−1|
2
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Table 3: Wage Variance Evolution in Veneto, Italy and West Germany
Veneto, Veneto Working Histories Data, Male Sample
Period Var(φj)
Var(ηi +
xitβ)
Var(eit)
2Cov(φj , ηi+
xitβ)
TOTAL
VAR.
1984-1989 0.029 0.068 0.008 -0.016 0.090
% of Total 32.2% 75.6% 8.9% -17.8% 100.0%
1996-2001 0.027 0.089 0.007 0.003 0.124
% of Total 21.8 71.8 5.6 2.4 100
% ∆ -7.1% 26.8% -13.3% 292.3% 31.8%
% ∆/∆TOT -7.1% 61.8% -2.9% 55.9% 100.0%
Italy, VisitINPS Data, Male Sample
Period Var(φj)
Var(ηi +
xitβ)
Var(eit)
2Cov(φj , ηi+
xitβ)
TOTAL
VAR.
1984-1990 0.039 0.087 0.013 0.004 0.143
% of Total 27% 61% 9% 3% 100%
1997-2003 0.036 0.117 0.010 0.022 0.185
% of Total 20% 63% 5% 12% 100%
% ∆ -7% 29% -27% 141% 26%
% ∆/∆TOT -6% 71% -8% 42% 100%
West Germany, IAB Data, Male Sample (from Card et al. [2013])
Period Var(φj)
Var(ηi +
xitβ)
Var(eit)
2Cov(φj , ηi+
xitβ)
TOTAL
VAR.
1985-1991 0.025 0.095 0.014 0.005 0.139
% of Total 18.1% 67.9% 10.2% 3.8% 100.0%
1996-2002 0.038 0.112 0.017 0.023 0.190
% of Total 19.9% 59.0% 8.9% 12.3% 100.0%
% ∆ 39.3% 16.6% 17.6% 125.5% 30.5%
% ∆/∆TOT 24.6% 34.2% 5.5% 35.7% 100.0%
Percentage changes for a given quantity z from t− 1 to t are computed using a reference value
zr defined as zr =
|zt|+|zt−1|
2
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Figure 1: Long-Run Evolution of Gross Weekly Wage St. Dev. in Veneto
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Source: Veneto Worker Histories data for the period 1976-1983. From the year 1984 (denoted by the
hollow circle in the figure) the series is derived from universe of Italian social security records (VisitINPS
data) and computed considering only firms located in Veneto.
Figure 2: St. Dev. of Log Daily Wages in Italy and Veneto
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Source: Veneto Worker Histories.
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Figure 3: Evolution of Log Daily Wages at by Percentile and Year
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Source: universe of Italian social security records (VisitINPS data).
Figure 4: Wage St. Dev. and RMSE from Alternative Wage Models
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Baseline controls: age (quadratic), tenure dummies, four qualification dummies, log of employees
number, sector fixed effects, national industry-wide collective contract fixed effects.
Models’ definition: (1) job title (livello di inquadramento) fixed effects; (2) firm fixed effects; (3) fully
saturated fixed effects for job titles and firms.
Note: national collective contracts vary within and across sectors, and might be not homogeneous across
years. Livelli di inquadramento are job titles determined by each national collective contract, and are
not homogeneous across years.
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Figure 5: Unconditional Wage Variance and Workers’ Wage Premiums
Variance Decomposition Within- and Between Job Titles
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Job titles (livelli di inquadramento) are defined within each sector-wide collective contract. In each year,
we have selected only job titles represented by at least 150 workers in the largest connected set of Veneto
firms, including a total number of distinct job titles between 435 (in 2001) and 520 (in 1984).
Figure 6: Workers’ Wage Premiums Variance Within- and Between Job Titles
by Sector and Occupation
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Figure 7: Proportion of Workers Within Quartiles of the Job Titles’ Average
Pay and Skills Distribution
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Figure 8: Within- and Between-Firms Decomposition of Unconditional Wage
Variance and Workers’ Wage Premiums Variance
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Worker’s wage premiums variance is defined as Var(ηi +xitβ). Since each panel that we have constructed
is partially overlapping, for each year we report only estimates of Var(ηi +xitβ) from the latest available
period. For each year, the unconditional wage variance is computed on the largest connected set in the
latest panel. Only firms located in Veneto are considered.
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A Other Tables
Table A.1: Detailed Variance Decomposition of Log Daily Wages
Period Var(φj) Var(ηi) Var(xitβ) Var(εit)
2Cov(φj ,
xitβ)
2Cov(φj ,
ηi)
2Cov(ηi,
xitβ)
TOTAL
VAR.
1982-87 0.032 0.052 0.008 0.008 0.002 -0.025 0.004 0.082
1984-89 0.029 0.052 0.009 0.008 0.002 -0.020 0.007 0.090
1988-93 0.027 0.058 0.010 0.008 0.005 -0.010 0.012 0.110
1992-97 0.028 0.061 0.010 0.006 0.006 -0.011 0.014 0.117
1996-01 0.027 0.060 0.018 0.007 0.007 -0.007 0.011 0.124
Comparision of AKM and Match Models
1982-1987 1984-1989 1988-1993 1992-1997 1996-2001
AKM adj. R2 0.866 0.877 0.908 0.928 0.926
Match model adj. R2 0.886 0.896 0.922 0.942 0.942
Variance of match effects 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006
The estimation sample is composed of all workers in the largest connected set, provided they where em-
ployed for at least four months. The AKM variance decomposition is computed only for firms located
in Veneto. The variance of match effects is estimated as difference in mean squared errors between the
AKM model and a match effect model (i.e. a model with separate fixed effects for each worker-firm pair).
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